1.Empirical or Hypothetical.
2.Physical or Mental.
3.Concrete and Abstract.
4.Presentative or Representative.
2.Kinds of Consciousness.
1.The Immediacy of Sense-Perception.
2.Logical Conditions of Recognition.
2.Aristotle, and Hellenic Logic.
3.Roman, Arab, Medieval European Logic.
6.In The 20th Century.
1.Formalization and Symbolization.
2.Systematization and Axiomatization.
4.Improvements and Innovations.
5.The Cutting Edge.
3.Shifts in Emphasis.
4.Setting the Stage.
1.Language and Meaning.
2.Definition and Proof.
3.Infinity in Logic.
1.Degrees of Being.
2.Induction from Logical Possibility.
3.History of Inductive Logic.
1.Summary of Findings.
2.Gaps to Fill.
Summary of findingsin the chapters of this part:
Part VII.Perspectives.In this final part of the book, we dealt with wider, more philosophical or historic issues. Chapters 60-62 together (with reference of course to all previous chapters) sketch my theory of cognition. Chapters 63-67 could be viewed as a separate volume, calledFor Future Logicians; it is a small-print commentary mostly intended for academics rather than general readers.
60. We looked into various ontological issues. What do we mean by phenomena? How do we distinguish the empirical from the hypothetical, the physical from the mental, the concrete from the abstract? Representation and analogy were briefly discussed.
61. Next, we pointed out the primarily relational nature of consciousness, and on this basis evolved a novel systematic classification of the kinds of consciousness, defining many of the epistemological terms used in the course of our logical treatise. We thereby proposed a more logically consistent theory of the mind, than that suggested by popular psychology and many philosophers and biologists.
62. We also considered some important logical issues surrounding sense-perception, and recognition and memory. These insights, together with those made previously, about the various kinds of phenomena and consciousness, and about imagination, allowed us to arrive at some understanding of ‘universals’.
63. We reviewed a history of logic, from Ancient Greece to the present, making positive or negative evaluations as we proceeded.
64. We analyzed concepts like formalization, symbolization, systematization, and axiomatization; and thus we began our critique of modern logic, mentioning also the more constructive contributions.
65. Continuing, with reference to literature on the subject, we tried to estimate the level of knowledge in current modal logic, its achievements and its weaknesses and blank areas.
66. We looked more closely into current views on metalogic (and incidentally class-logic), countering them with our own views of language and meaning, definition and proof, and indeed of the foundations and role of logic as a whole.
67. We then deepened our understanding of all modality, as signifying different kinds and degrees of being; and we indicated how our theory of factorial induction can be expanded to include logical modality — to precisely solve the problem of induction from logical possibility, and thus explain the essential continuity between this mode and thede-retypes. Then we looked into the current state of knowledge in inductive logic, endorsing or disagreeing as appropriate, and pointed out a methodological standard.
68. The whole was finally summarized here, and in the next section I mention some possible areas of research for future logicians.